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COMMENTS 
CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-ELEMENTS INV ALUATION 
OF CORPORATE STOCK-Statutes have been enacted in forty-five 
states, the District of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii giving 
a dissenting shareholder the right to demand an impartial appraisal 
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of the value of his stock in one or more of the following situations: 
merger, consolidation, charter amendment, or sale of assets.1 Most 
of these statutes are silent as to the meaning of value or the ele-
ments to be considered in determining value.2 The purpose of 
this comment is to consider the elements of stock valuation gen-
erally applicable under the statutory appraisal remedies, and to 
analyze in some detail the interpretation of such a statute in one 
jurisdiction-Delaware. 
I 
Recently this question was examined by the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores.3 In that case a group 
of dissenting shareholders brought a proceeding for the appraisal 
of their shares following a merger.4 The appraiser fixed the value 
of the shares at $30.61. In so doing he used the following value 
elements and relative weights: (1) market value (10%), (2) earn-
ings value (25%), (3) sales value (25%), and (4) asset value 
(40%). Both the corporation and the dissenting shareholders filed 
objections. On review, the court of chancery held that the ap-
praiser erred in giving market value an independent weight since 
there was no dependable market at or about the effective date of 
the merger. It further held that the earnings value was miscom-
puted. The court found that the appraiser should have used not 
the earnings of a single year but rather the average earnings over 
a period of time, and it reduced the rate of capitalization from 
ten to eight in light of the nature of the enterprise (retail ladies' 
apparel). Sales value was held not acceptable as an independent 
element of value since it was but another means of reflecting earn-
ings value. Asset value was held correctly determined. Accord-
ingly the court revised the appraiser's valuation of the shares to 
$24.74, using only asset value, which was then weighted 40%, and 
earnings value, which the court weighted at 60%. 
II 
Market value, net asset value, and investment value are the 
three standards which have received almost unanimous recognition 
1 For citations of statutes as of 1952, see 38 VA. L. REv. 915 at 915 to 931 (1952). 
Since 1952 three other states have enacted appraisal statutes. See Miss. Gen. Laws (1954) 
c. 201, §3 (fair market value), S.D. Sess. Laws (1955) c. 17, §7 (value at time corporate 
action was authorized), and 3A Tex. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1956) §5.12 (fair value). 
2 Examples of more explicit statutes are Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) 
§§4300 to 4318 (fair market value); N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§14:12-6, 12-7 (market value). 
3 (Del. Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121. 
4 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (b). 
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in statutory appraisals of stock. The relative importance of each 
of these factors varies from one jurisdiction to another, and usually 
depends upon what the courts deem to be the function of the 
appraisal.5 Even within a given jurisdiction the proportional 
weight assigned to these elements will usually be governed by the 
nature of the corporation and the type of stock. 
A. Market Value. Market value generally refers to the price 
at which the stock was selling on the market prior to the action 
which is objected to, disregarding any change in price due to the 
action.6 Delaware has held that the word "value" in its statute is 
not synonymous with market value, and that while market value 
is a factor to be considered, the value of the stock is not to be meas-
ured exclusively by market quotations prior to the date of the 
action complained of.7 It seems that Delaware will not give a 
prominent weight to market value even where quotations from a 
well traded stock are available.8 Further, Delaware courts have laid 
aside all consideration of market value where the merger com-
plained of has distorted the entire market,9 or, as in the Sporborg 
case, where there has been no reliable market for the stock.10 
While New York has also rejected the contention that market 
value alone is controlling,11 its decisions in cases where there was 
a substantial market appear to have favored market value as being 
presumptively controlling under the New York statutes.12 
5 See 28 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1021 at 1022 (1953). 
6 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 828 (1937), points out that market value in 
a more strict sense would be "utterly inapplicable," for it "reflects the influence of the 
very sale or merger against which the dissenter is seeking a remedy." 
7 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del.Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); In re General Realty 
&: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947). 
8 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950). This 
decision permitted a market value weight of 45% for common stock. Other Delaware 
decisions have seldom weighted market value above 30%. 
9 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del.Ch. 523, 74 A. (2d) 71 (1950); Sterling v. 
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 293, 93 A. (2d) 107 (1952); 38 A.L.R. (2d) 425 at 
442 (1954). 
10 Accord, American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937), holding 
that the court could reject the market value of preferred shares where such were not 
listed and transactions in the stock were too few to have any effect. 
11 See, e.g., In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 
N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1946); In re Wood, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) ll0 (1951). 
12 Matter of Marcus, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 529 (1948), mod. 273 App. Div. 
725, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 76 at 81, affd. 302 N.Y. 881, 100 N.E. (2d) 55 (1951); In re Deutsch-
mann, ll6 N.Y.S. (2d) 578 (1952); In re Silverman, 115 N.Y.S. (2d) 97 at 99 (1952), to 
the effect that where " ... there are actual purchases and sales of such stock in sub• 
stantial volume at and near to the date as of which value is to be determined . • • 
market value is controlling at least to the extent that it would take strong and con-
vincing evidence of some other fact, as distinguished from mere opinion, to justify a 
departure from it. . • ." 
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In Ohio,13 New Jersey,14 · and California,15 the statute is ex-
pressly phrased in terms of "market value" or "fair market value." 
Where such language appears, market value has assumed a pre-
dominant, if not determinative, role.16 Strong arguments have 
been raised, however, against a heavy reliance on market value 
even in the face of statutory direction in favor of fair market value. 
It has been pointed out that market processes are largely psycho-
logical, and that, because of its speculative nature, market value is 
frequently out of line with intrinsic worth.17 
B. Net Asset Value. Net asset value is the share which the 
stock represents in the value of the net assets of the corporation. 
It is a value based on a hypothetical dissolution and distribution 
of the corporate assets.18 The Delaware Supreme Court in Tri-
Continental Corp. v. Battye19 has taken the position that the share 
must be valued as a continuing interest in a "going: concern," since 
this is what the shareholder has been deprived of by the merger 
or consolidation. Such a view necessarily denies a use of liquidat-
ing value as the sole measure of valuation. Broadly speaking, net 
asset value has assumed real significance (1) where, as in the Spor-
borg case, there has been no reliable market for the stock;20 (2) 
where, due to the nature of the corporation, market value and 
asset value were virtually identical;21 (3) where the corporation 
was bordering on dissolution;22 or (4) where the dissenting share-
holders were viewed as holding stock in a company whose legal 
existence had terminated, and were thus actually entitled to a dis-
tribution of its net assets.23 Several authorities on security analysis 
13 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) §1701.80 (fair cash value). 
14 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§14:12-6, 12-7. 
15 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering; 1953) §§4300 to 4318. 
16 See Prall v. U.S. Leather Co., 6 N.J. Misc. 967, 143 A. 382 (1928), affd. 105 N.J.L 
646, 146 A. 916 (1929). 
17 See 40 CALIF. L. REv. 140 at 144 (1952). 
182 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 831 (1937). 
19 31 Del.Ch. 523 at 526, 74 A. (2d) 71 (1950). See also Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 
Del.Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934). Accord, Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del.Ch. 127, 32 
A. (2d) 148 (1943), where court refused to use liquidation value as the sole test in an 
action to determine fairness of a merger. 
20In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). 
21 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947), where 
assets consisted of one-third cash and two-thirds securities. 
22 Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del.Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929). 
23American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 at 637, 190 A. 225 (1937): "The 
owner of shares of stock in a corporation whose legal existence is at an end would be 
entitled to receive the aliquot proportion • . . in the distribution of the net amount 
of corporate funds in which his particular kind of stock would be entitled to share." 
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have recommended that asset value should at best be a secondary 
consideration to investment (i.e., earnings, dividend) value.24 
Delaware has recognized that net asset value may not properly 
be omitted as a value factor in an appraisal proceeding.25 In prac-
tice, the relative weight given to asset value has been largely related 
to the nature of the corporation's business. Typically, net asset 
value has been weighted as high as 50% in the case of an invest-
ments and property holding company26 and as low as 20% for an 
ordinary manufacturing company.27 A net asset value weight of 
40% was approved in the Sporborg case where the merging cor-
poration was in the women's specialty sales business. The court 
stressed that the firm's investment and expansion policies accounted 
for the relatively heavy weight accorded asset value.28 In ascer-
taining asset value, Delaware has approved recourse to reproduc-
tion cost rather than original cost, apparently allowing appraisers 
a discretionary choice between the alternative methods.29 
C. Investment Value. Investment value is an estimate of 
present worth in light of past, present, and prospective financial 
records of the company. If the court takes the view, as does 
Delaware, that a shareholder is being deprived of his proportional 
share in a "going concern" in which he might otherwise continue 
to share in its earnings and dividends in the indefinite future, it 
would seem that investment value would most appropriately reflect 
this earnings and dividends loss.30 Earnings are usually the key 
24 "In the case of stocks, however, earning power [must be] put ahead of the value 
of the assets. The return to stockholders is contingent on the net earnings per share 
• • • the primary purpose . • • is to avoid buying issues that are apt to fail." D1'.CE AND 
EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET, 3d ed., 417 (1952). Cf. GRAHAM AND DODD, SECURITY 
.ANALYSIS, 3d ed., 477 to 478 (1951); 40 CAI.IF. L. REV. 140 (1952). 
25 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 293 at 308, 93 A. (2d) 107 
(1952); 38 A.L.R. (2d) 425 at 442 (1954). 
26 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947). 
27 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953) (established manu-
facturer of hosiery, underclothing, and sleeping wear). See Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-
Moline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950). 
28 (Del.Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121 at 127: "However, I believe the asset value element 
must be given somewhat greater weight here because, for some time, Opcol was using 
more than an average amount of its assets to expand and improve its business activities 
and much of this was not yet reflected in earnings." 
29 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593 at 596, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953). This seems 
to make it clear that net asset value is not necessarily synonymous with book value, 
though the court did take account of obsolescence by reducing the weight of net asset value. 
30 See I DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 287 (1953): " ••• in 
spite of practical difficulty ••• the capitalization of earnings is the only means .•• for 
determining the value of a going business." Dudley v. Mealey, (2d Cir. 1945) 147 F. 
(2d) 268 at 270 (citing cases): "The Supreme Court has several times said that the best 
test of the value of a going commercial enterprise is its earning capacity." 
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factor in value and are what the dissenting shareholder surren-
ders.31 Further, it is generally true that the trend of market prices 
is to a high degree dependent on the pattern of earnings.32 
In calculating investment value, it is necessary (I) to establish 
an earnings figure and (2) to select an appropriate rate of capital-
ization. 33 In the Sporborg decision the Delaware court disapproved 
the appraiser's use of earnings derived only from the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the effective date of the merger, expressing 
its preference for an averaging of earnings over a reasonable period 
of time.34 Delaware has also approved of the use of estimated 
future income rather than actual past earnings as a base for cap-
italization. 35 In regard to the rate of capitalization, close attention 
must be paid to the characteristics of the particular corporation, 
comparing each corporation's rate of earnings with those of other 
similarly situated enterprises. Recent Delaware cases have ap-
proved capitalization rates that are "within the range of reason,"36 
and the Sporborg case used the classifications of Mr. Dewing as a 
general guide to reasonableness.37 
Though most jurisdictions recognize investment value as ap-
plicable in appraisal proceedings, 38 few have given this element 
particular emphasis, and only Delaware appears to have accorded 
it a consistently significant position. The first mention by the Dela-
ware courts of the role of investment value was in Allied Chemical 
31 Cf. DoWRIE AND FULLER, INVESTMENTS, 2d ed., 512 (1950); GRAHAM AND DODD, 
SECURITY ANALYSIS, 3d ed., 410 to 4ll (1951); Bonbright, "The Problem of Judicial 
Valuation," 27 CoL. L. REv. 493 at 522 (1927). 
32D1CE AND EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET, 3d ed., p. 417 (1952). See 40 CALIF. L. 
REv. 140 at 144, 145 (1952): "In stripping the market value of its unfairness courts are 
in reality finding investment value. In reason, this should be so, for if the market were 
an unemotional, purely logical organism it would reflect only the investment value of 
securities." 
33 For a sampling of many of the factors entering into investment value, see 16 
BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 86 (1950) and 24 TULANE L. REv. 464 (1950). 
34 (Del.Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121 at 124, 125. The court relied upon In re General 
Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2~) 6 (1947), and 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUA-
TION OF PROPERTY 253 (1937), recommending a three to five year earnings figure. See 
also Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950) and Heller 
v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953), where five year earning periods 
were approved. 
35 In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947). 
36 See Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950) and 
Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953) where multipliers of 5 and 
7, respectively, were approved. 
37 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POUCY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 390 (1953), cited in Cot-
trell v. Pawcatuck Co., (Del.Ch. 1955) ll6 A. (2d) 787 at 791 (multiplier of 7 or 8 
approved for manufactUTer having large assets). 
38 See In re Belrrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 910 (1946); In re Northwest Greyhound Lines, 41 Wash. (2d) 672, 251 P. (2d) 607 
(1952). See also 38 A.L.R. (2d) 442 at 466 (1954). 
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and Dye Corp. v. Steel and Tube Co.,39 where the court held that 
earning power controls over replacement cost. In 194 7, the court 
of chancery approved a weight of 25 % for earnings and dividends 
value in appraising the stock of an investment company,40 and in 
1950 expressed satisfaction with a weight of 30% to 35% for the 
same factors in the case of a manufacturing company.41 Subse-
quently, in 1953, the court increased the influence of the dividend 
and earnings factors from 45% to 50% in the case of an ordinary 
manufacturing corporation.42 A further extension of the Delaware 
courts' reliance on investment value is seen in the Sporborg case 
where investment value is given a final weight of 60% by the court 
with the indication that it would have received greater considera-
tion but for certain special circumstances.43 
III 
The question naturally arises as to what justification there is 
for the weighting which finally is assigned to the value elements in 
a given case. Initially, of course, the weights are assigned in the 
discretion of the appraiser who, in Delaware, is appointed by the 
court of chancery.44 Prior to 1943 it seemed that neither the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery nor the federal district court had the 
power to compel appraisers to modify their decisions as to the value 
of stock.45 Since 1943, however, exceptions to the appraiser's re-
port have been heard before the chancery court on both the law 
and the facts, and the court has determined the final value and 
directed payment.46 The court has held that the appraiser should 
state the value of the elements given independent weight and the 
weight given to each in reaching the appraised value,47 and it has 
felt free to make "such modifications as may be dictated."48 In 
3914 Del.Ch. 64, 122 A. 142 (1923) (an action to enjoin the sale of assets). 
40 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947). 
41 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950). 
42 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953). 
43 Note 28 supra. 
44 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (e). In some jurisdictions the appraiser is chosen 
by the parties themselves or the court makes the appraisal. See 38 VA. L. REv. 915 at 
930 (1952). 
45 Root v. York Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 288 [under Del. Rev. Code 
(1935) §2093]. However, the state court could refuse to order the dissenting share-
holders to deliver over their shares. 
46 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (f). 
47 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368 at 372, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950). 
48 In r_e General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480 at 490, 52 A. (2d) 9 (1947), 
quoting Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 at 182 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 
1007, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1946). 
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deciding whether changes should be made the court has taken the 
general position that the elements and weights assigned by the 
appraiser will be sustained if they are not "arbitrary or unreason-
able."49 The presumption in favor of the appraiser's determination, 
however, is at best a tenuous one, for the chancery court's deter-
mination of what weights are not arbitrary or reasonable appears 
to be highly discretionary5° and predictable, if at all, only by ref-
erence to prior cases with analogous facts. 
IV 
It appears from the foregoing that the function of an appraisal 
has been held by the Delaware courts to be compensation of a dis-
senting shareholder for his loss in a "going concern." In measur-
ing the present worth of this lost right, the Sporborg decision ap-
parently reflects a trend of increasing judicial approval of a greater 
role for investment (including earnings and dividends) value in 
statutory appraisal proceedings.51 It seems that such a trend has 
the dual desirability of diminishing the role of the many specula-
tive factors found in market value and of avoiding excessive treat-
ment of the appraisal as primarily a liquidation proceeding which 
seems contrary to valuation on a "going concern" basis52 and in-
consistent with the expectations of the average stockholder in 
making his investment. This is not to suggest that market value and 
asset value are irrelevant to a meaningful valuation or to say that 
these elements may not often be of great significance. The weight 
given to any value factor will always be closely related to the nature 
of the corporation and the character of the stock. It is felt, how-
ever, that investment value is the most realistic measure of the 
interest which the dissenting shareholqer has lost in a "going con-
cern" as a result of the merger, consolidation, amendment, or sale 
of assets.53 
John C. Baity 
49 Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368 at 374, 75 A. (2d) 6 (1950). 
50 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del.Ch. 101 at 115, 66 A. (2d) 910 (1949): 
"Any weighting of the factors is, of course, arbitrary. • • ." 
51 It is interesting to note that the increasing reliance by the Delaware courts on 
investment value has apparently not been affected by the nature of the enterprise. See 
notes 39 to 43 supra. 
52 See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 831 to 834 (1937). 
53 See id. at 834: "Value based on hypothetical market value of a continuing invest-
ment ••• should become the prevailing [standard], subject to modifications in special 
cases." Cf. In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). 
